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A Study of Entrepreneur and Small Businesses’ Required 
Returns and Empirical Observation of Actual 
Entrepreneurial Returns Attained
Dr. Charles John Conrick, IV 
Dickinson State University
The purpose of this study was to examine previous Uterature on Entrepreneurs’ and 
small businesses’ (hereinafter simply, Entrepreneurs) required rates of return coupled with 
empirical observation of small business returns. It is hoped that this study provides 
Entrepreneurs with a guideline of what they should expect to earn in the marketplace given 
the risk they take coupled with an analysis of what actually has happened. Previous returns 
were compiled from the Institute of Business Appraisers (IBA) database of small business 
sales from the years 1982 to 2000. Additionally, publicly traded, large company earnings and 
returns were gathered for the same time frame from Standard and Poor’s (S&P) Compustat 
database. Both sets of data are large samples, approximately 11,000 from IBA and 19,000 
from S&P. Thus, it is assumed that statistical power of sampling error is minimized and 
returns reflect approximate reality.
A review of current literature indicates that only seminal work has been done on 
required, rational, rates of return for Entrepreneurs. Much work has been done on large, 
pubhcly traded stocks. The purpose of this paper is to explore previous work and attempt to 
provide more evidence on Entrepreneurs’ required and actual returns.
I. Purpose of the Study and Theoretical Basis
The purpose of the study was to examine the returns that Entrepreneurs and small 
business persons (hereinafter synonymous) would rationally require given the risks taken in
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their enterprises. Secondly, in Part Two, actual returns accomplished by Entrepreneurs are 
presented. In order to accomplish this, the approach is that Entrepreneurs have a choice 
between entering into their own business or alternatively, investing in the universe of 
financial instruments available to achieve a required rate of return given their propensity to 
take risk and to make rational decisions. These are two critical constructs. A review of 
existing literature on Entrepreneurial decision making indicates that much of the 
Entrepreneur’s decision to “go on his/her own” is predicated on behavioral finance motives. 
These include 1. Risk Tolerance, 2. Other Pecuniary Benefits and Costs, 3. Nonpecuniary 
Benefits, 4. Preference for Skewness, and 5. Overoptimism and Misperceived Risk 
(Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002). If an assumption is made that any or all of these 
behavioral motives play a large part in the decision to begin or continue Entrepreneurial 
activities, it is possible that rational investment decision making is not paramount. Certainly, 
psychic income is worth something, perhaps much, taken individual by individual. In 
addition, one Entrepreneur may be perfectly satisfied with an X rate of return whereas another 
requires X + X" given the same or greater level of risk. Quantification of behavioral issues, 
not the topic of this study, is an area of great research potential.
Estimating the Required Return for Entrepreneurs
Perhaps one of the most interesting studies done to date is the work of Kerins, Smith, 
and Smith (2004). In this study, “Opportunity Cost of Capital for Venture Capital Investors 
and Entrepreneurs”, the authors make the lucid argument that “Risk tolerance cannot justify 
an investment that is expected to provide total benefits that are less than the expected 
pecuniary return of an equally risky investment in the market.” In short, an Entrepreneur 
considering an enterprise with an expected return similar to the Standard and Poors’ (S&P) 
500 Index (a surrogate for market return) would have to balance the assessment with the 
purported risk of the venture.
The arithmetic average of the S&P 500 (market) over the period 1928 to 2006 is 
approximately 11.77%, the geometric average is 9.86%, and the standard deviation is 
approximately 19.79%. The logic from Kerins, Smith, and Smith would correctly convey that 
an Entrepreneur must rationally contemplate the rate of return and risk from past and expected 
market returns prior to his/her decision to assume risks that may offer returns insufficient to 
compensate for that risk. Carrying this logic further, the surrogate return for the “risk-free” 
rate, US Treasury Bills over the same time frame has been approximately 3.9% with a 
standard deviation of 3.07%. Treasury Bills are generally considered risk free due to their 
short maturity and lack of default risk. For simplicity’s sake, Kerins, Smith, and Smith use 
rounded numbers of market returns of 10% with a standard deviation of 20% and a risk free 
rate of 4% to construct an interesting model to evaluate required returns for an Entrepreneur 
given risk and lack of diversification, especially considering that the Entrepreneur, in many 
cases, has 100% or only slightly less of his/her equity holdings invested in the business. 
Investment counselors decry lack of diversification as perhaps the single biggest risk in asset 
allocation stemming from a study done by Ibbotson and Sinquefeld (1982). This study is 
recognized as one of the most authoritative on the reasons for diversification indicating that 
most of the explanation for returns on a portfolio is the result of asset allocation as opposed to 
individual stock picks.
Virtually all Finance or Investment textbooks state that any investment is exposed to 
two types of risk, systematic (non-diversifiable) and unsystematic (diversiflable). A well
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diversified investor virtually eliminates unsystematic risk leaving only the systematic or 
market risk which cannot be diversified av^ay from. Thus, the argument from Kerins, Smith, 
and Smith is perfectly logical in light of modem financial theory. That is, the Entrepreneur 
must attempt to price unsystematic (diversifiable) risk when making a full or partial 
commitment to an Entrepreneurial venture. This argument stems from the heretofore 
mentioned research which forms the underlying premise of modem financial theory and the 
basis of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
Kerins, Smith, and Smith use the CAPM as a method of attempting to discover the 
“cosf ’ of the unsystematic risk in the case of the Entrepreneur making either a full or partial 
commitment to a venture. An example from the Kerins, Smith, and Smith paper is replicated 
here to clarify the actual findings presented later in this paper.
The single factor CAPM model can be expressed as r. =rj. + -r^ ) where;
n = Required retum on an investment. 
rf= The Risk free rate.
Vm = The market retum.
PMkt^ The investment’s Beta with the market.
p  Mia can be expressed as the [pim cJt]/ (Jm where:
pirn = the correlation between the market and the investment in a venture.
Gi= the standard deviation of the investment in an Entrepreneurial venture. 
cFm = the standard deviation of the market, taken in its entirety.
13 CJiRearranging terms; — provides an estimate of total risk of a venture.
p im  Om
Specifically, the standard deviation of the investment’s returns divided by the standard 
deviation of the market factors out the correlation between the investment and the market 
providing a “Total” Beta which would, by implication, include both systematic and
unsystematic risk (Damodaran, 2002). — is a relative standard deviation measure which
Om
includes all the risk taken in the venture including that not correlated with the market. The 
Total Beta, in theory, including systematic and unsystematic risk can be characterized as
- P j ^  Thus, if an Entrepreneurial venture’s expected standard deviation of returns was
P im
estimated at 25% with 20% correlation with market returns, an estimate of expected retum
would be- 4% + — (l0% -4% ) = 11.5% using the Total Beta approach. Assuming the 
•20 , ,  . 
Entrepreneur was well diversified, a small investment in an Entrepreneurial venture could, m
theory, have a required retum of which with the aforesaid numbers would
equate to: 4% + .25(10% -  4%) = 5.5%.
n ^ ^ 25 in this example whereas Total Beta = 1.25.
(7  20%
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If it is assumed that a venture had a PMkt of 1.25 and an assumed pim of 20%, the Total
1 25Beta would be computed as: — . Solving fox Pm  Yields Ptoi= 6.25. The required return of
0.20
the venture under these assumptions would be 4%+ 6.25(10%-4%) = 41.5%. Thus, the 
relationship between Total Beta is clearly dependent on the observed Pmu and the estimates 
of Pim and cTj. A venture with a Total Beta of 6.25 that is assumed to have di pim of 100% would
have to have an assumed cr, of = cr. =125%.
1.00 .20
As pointed out by Kerins, Smith, and Smith, the Entrepreneur is not well diversified if 
he/she provides a full commitment to the venture and must consider this “under­
diversification” in their portfolio decision. Kerins, Smith, and Smith argue that using market 
data, as shown above, underestimates opportunity cost and therefore utilize a certainty 
equivalent CAPM model in an attempt to estimate the cost to the Entrepreneur for the lack of 
diversification. This article will not explain all the rationale employed by Kerins, Smith, and 
Smith and the interested reader should access their article for the complete derivation of the 
model. However, it is sufficient to observe that the Entrepreneur using the Total Beta 
approach may well infer that his/her required return on a venture given the sample data would 
be 11.5% assuming a fiill commitment to the venture. As noted above, this estimate of a 
required return would require an estimate of Pmt of .25 and Pfot = 1-25. This assumption, 
according to Kerins, Smith, and Smith fails to adequately account for the Entrepreneur’s 
under-diversification.
In valuation theory, unsystematic or company specific risk is often estimated as a 
premium added to the CAPM model cited above. In the above example, an analyst may begin 
with the risk free rate, add the market equity risk premium, a factor for small company 
systematic risk, and finally add a factor for company specific risk based on comparables, a 
factor method, or a rule of thumb applicable to a particular industry. Thus, given the numbers 
cited above, the required return for a well diversified investor into a venture with a market 
Beta of 1.25 may be calculated as -r^ ) + e = 4% + 1.25(10% - 4%) + e, where e
is a factor estimated as the company specific risk component. If e is estimated to be 10%, by 
whatever method used, the required return used to discount future income or cash flows 
would be 11.5% + 10% = 21.5%. Unfortunately, this method appears prone to subjectivity 
and may well not capture the true risk component or the risk of under-diversification.
Kerins, Smith, and Smith’s model approaches the problem through a unique approach 
by treating investment in the market as a zero NPV opportunity. The effect of under­
diversification in the model is subsequently assigned to the investment in an Entrepreneurial 
venture. Certainly, an argument can be made that investment in the market is not a zero NPV 
opportunity. However, by making this assumption, Kerins, Smith, and Smith are able to 
construct a model using modem financial theory, certainty equivalents, measures of variance, 
and weightings which are intuitively elegant and attempt to mathematically capture the cost of 
“true” under-diversification to an Entrepreneur.
For example, using the numbers fi*om above, Kerins, Smith, and Smith’s model 
computes the present value of an Entrepreneurial venture as:
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Where:
PVev= Present Value of the Entrepreneur’s venture.
CFy -  Risk free Cash flow of a venture at expiry.
rv= Computed Beta comparable required return on the venture.
pv,m = Correlation between venture and market.
Vf -  the risk free rate.
Given a $1.00 investment into the venture now, the computed Present Value of the 
Entrepreneur’s venture at t = I is:
-« .6 3 9 .
1 + .04
This implies that the return for a full commitment by the Entrepreneur would be 
~ .564 or 56.4% as opposed to the 11.5% contemplated by the Total Beta approach
.639
presented earlier. An argument can be made that the Total Beta approach accounts for total 
risk due to its focus on the contrast of the standard deviation of a venture’s retums being 
divided by the standard deviations of the market. In theory, both systematic and unsystematic 
risk are accounted for with the Total Beta approach eliminating the need to compensate for 
Company Specific risk denoted as the premium, e, earlier. The main thrust of the points made 
by Kerins, Smith, and Smith appear to relate to risk attributable to under-diversification and 
not necessarily or only to Company Specific risk. The model can be utilized to value full and 
partial commitments to an Entrepreneurial venture. Table I illustrates the theoretical 
opportunity cost given a percentage weight invested in an Entrepreneurial venture and its 
correlation with the risk of the market as measured by the standard deviation.
For example, an Entrepreneur placing 40% in a Venture, 60% (100% - 40%) in the 
market, assuming the Venture is 20% correlated with the market, and fiirther assuming a 
comparable firm Beta of 1.25 would encounter an approximate opportunity cost of 44.5% on 
the Entrepreneurial venture as indicated by the percentage in the framed box. Thus, the 
Entrepreneur in the case above would invest 60% in the market with a 10% expected retum 
and 40% in the venture and should expect to discount future cash flows at approximately 
44.5%. With a partial commitment, the weightings are actually complicated by the computed 
present value of the Entrepreneurial Venture. In this example, the NPV of the market 
commitment is .60 with an expected retum of .06 for a total of .66. The expected retum of the 
venture is .40 times 1.115 equals .446. Making the assumption that the market is a zero NPV
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opportunity, the present value of the portfolio is = .909. The NPV of the Venture is .909
309
- .60 = .309 which is -^ ^ « 3 4 % o f  the Entrepreneur’s present value wealth. Thus, to be
precise, 66% of wealth would be invested in the market and 34% would be invested in the 
venture with the expectation that 44.5% would need to be the return on the venture due to 
under-diversification. By implication, this premium for under-diversification should also 
apply to an investor purchasing only one publicly traded stock as he/she would not be well 
diversified either. For example, an investment in only one large, publicly traded firm, such as 
IBM would be subject to systematic and unsystematic risk attributable solely to IBM. 
Therefore, Kerins, Smith, and Smith’s model appears to be a lucid method of capturing the 
opportunity cost of both systematic and unsystematic risk for any venture using the market as 
the benchmark for adequate diversification or elimination of unsystematic, company specific 
risk. ^
It is interesting to note in Table I that the estimated opportunity cost given 100% 
correlation with the market is calculated to be 41.5% regardless of the weight placed in the 
venture. This is analogous to the earlier described Total Beta approach where an investment 
with an observed ^Mkt of 1.25 and a pim of 0.20 was found to require a 41.5% retum. 
Essentially, this is due to the use of the market as a zero NPV opportunity where unaccounted 
for variance in an Entrepreneurial venture is accounted for by assigning it to the venture while 
leaving the market (systematic) variance constant. If the pim = 100%, the di must equal 125% 
and ^Mkt = 6.25. Thus, the expected retum of the venture using the model would be 
4% + 6.25(10% -  4%) = 41.5% regardless of the weights placed in the venture and the market.
The work done by Kerins, Smith, and Smith provides a unique and intuitively logical 
way of addressing Entrepreneurial required returns given either full or partial commitments.
Sliwoski (1999) provides other evidence to assess required rates of retum for 
Entrepreneurs. Sliwoski quotes the empirical observations of James Schilt (1991).
Schilt studied small business risk premiums and categorized the risks into specific 
descriptions of business types. These risk premiums were based on an analysis of published 
data as available from Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation (SBBI) along with Schilt’s own 
experience and observations as an analyst of closely held businesses. The risk premiums are 
shown in Table II.
Schilt concludes, after fiirther study of these discount rates, that they still appear to 
have validity as discount rates added to the risk free rate. Thus, the risk premiums include the 
equity risk premium, industry risk, and the company specific risk. Unlike the model discussed 
by Kerins, Smith, and Smith, Schilt’s observations are empirically based and do not purport to 
address the notion of the under-diversification many Entrepreneurs are subject to.
Robert Slee (2004), in an original and cutting edge text entitled Private Capital 
Markets, states his belief that private equity markets are relatively inefficient as contrasted to 
public equity markets due primarily to lack of opacity. Slee states “the capital asset pricing 
model or other predictive models are not suitable for use in creating the expected rates of 
retum in the private markets.” This is an issue that is open to debate as the public capital
 ^ The calculations in Table I were made by this author and assume a correct interpretation of Kerins, Smith, and 
Smith’s model. Errors, if  any, are those o f the author o f this article.
markets do serve as, at least, a foundation for perceived private equity returns. However, 
Slee’s work is innovative and logical in that he portends to view the nuances of private equity 
returns in an entirely new light. Slee presents a theory of a “private capital line” which 
primarily consists of the expected returns of capital providers in the private markets. These 
returns are replicated from Slee’s book in Table III.
It is important to note that these rates are also empirically based in that they represent 
actually observed required rates of return of these capital providers. Arguably, equity 
financing returns can be inferred to begin with the Equity Mezzanine Capital classification 
which implies required private equity returns in a range from about 30% to as high as about 
53%.
Assumptions
Given the aforesaid discussion, the following assumptions appear to meet a rational 
and valid set of conclusions:
1. An Entrepreneur must eam the Vf, the risk free rate which is assumed to be 
approximately 4% as stated earlier.
2. An Entrepreneur, in order to meet or exceed a rational investor’s requirement 
to eam at least, the return which accounts for systematic risk, must eam a 
retum which meets or exceeds the retum on a surrogate for a well diversified 
market. In this study, the surrogate for the market retum, rm, is assumed to be 
about 10% which is the approximate geometric retum of the S&P 500 since 
1928. Thus, the equity risk premium is estimated to be 10% - 4% = 6%.
3. An Entrepreneur must consider the excess risk (volatility) that has been 
empirically been shown to be indigenous to small companies. This is often 
calculated by observing the historical retums on S&P 500 small cap stocks 
which have historically retumed approximately 2.3% more than S&P 500 large 
cap stocks.^
4. An Entrepreneur must consider the excess risk associated with exposure to 
unsystematic or company-specific (diversifiable) risk based on his/her level of 
commitment to an Entrepreneurial venture. The excess retum required for 
unsystematic risk is arguably, the vaguest measure due to lack of market data 
coupled with the fact that every venture generates its own specific risks. The 
Total Beta approach can be used to estimate a particular firm’s exposure to 
unsystematic risk and would vary from one entity to another dependent on
industry type or class.
5. An Entrepreneur must consider, again based on his/her level of commitment to 
a venture, a required retum for under-diversification. If an Entrepreneur is 
primarily invested in a single Entrepreneurial venture, unsystematic risk and 
under-diversification must be considered. The model proposed by Kerins, 
Smith, Smith provides a method of estimating under-diversification. The 
computations gleaned from Table I indicate that the required premium for 
under-diversification is significant.
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It is doubtful that most Entrepreneurs truly consider these five conclusions when 
making a decision to invest in an Entrepreneurial venture. A valid argument can also be made 
that, if totally considered, few Entrepreneurs would choose to invest capital, human or 
pecuniary, in a venture if they believed they had to discount future cash flows at rates of 
return in a range of 40% and greater. Conversely, the survival rate of new ventures is 
alarmingly low. Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988) found that 61.5% of firms exited the 
manufacturing industry within five years of a census and that 79.6% exited within ten years. 
According to the U.S. Small Business Administration, approximately 33% of new employer 
firms exit within two years of inception and about 56% exit within four years.^ In short, the 
odds of long term success for a startup Entrepreneur are low. This provides further argument 
for assessment of risk in the Entrepreneur’s venture decision.
However, as reported by the Small Business Administration (SBA), there are 25.8 
million small businesses in the U.S. Further, small businesses generate 60 to 80% of net new 
jobs annually, employ 50.6% of the private sector workforce, represent 97% of all the 
exporters of goods, and represent 99.7% of all employer firms. It is obvious that 
Entrepreneurs comprise a major force in the U.S. and global economy regardless of how risk 
and return is accounted for or estimated.
It would seem logical to assume that Entrepreneurs are aware that upon entering any 
new venture, they would encounter competitive forces. A corollary to that assumption would 
be that the rational Entrepreneur would want to earn at least as much or more than 
competitors in similar industries. For example, an Entrepreneur starting a small construction 
company or restaurant should presume that he/she can earn a rate of return on his/her 
investment, human or pecuniary, equivalent to his/her competition. Assuming that a fair rate 
of return for construction companies is about 25% of Sales, the new entrant would 
undoubtedly attempt to recover that rate, or more, in order to substantiate his/her decision to 
provide the effort required to start and subsequently continue in the venture. This poses a 
theoretical problem and a critical issue in this analysis. If the market dictates the return, which 
it arguably does, it is further quite possible and even probable that the Entrepreneur has not 
truly considered his/her required rate of return as discussed in the five previous assumptions. 
Ironically, neither can he/her! The particular private market encountered forces the 
Entrepreneur to conform to market returns in that particular market or exit assuming no 
Entrepreneur can continue to make abnormal profits for an extended time period. Therefore, it 
is quite possible that competitive forces determining a particular private market return may 
preclude an Entrepreneur from earning returns congruent with the five assumptions of 
economic and financial reality listed above. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) state 
that “Overall, the diversified portfolio of public equity seems to offer a far more attractive 
risk-retum trade-off than that obtained by the typical entrepreneur.” They also conclude that 
“The implication is that private equity returns appear low given their risk.”
This conclusion is inconsistent with the earlier presumption of Kerins, Smith, and 
Smith that “Risk tolerance cannot justify an investment that is expected to provide total 
benefits that are less than the expected pecuniary return of an equally risky investment in the 
market.” Nevertheless, both positions appear to be true both empirically and rationally.
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Entrepreneurs do not seem to be adequately rewarded for the risks assumed and can be 
adjudicated to be economically irrational if they do so. Obviously, either there are behavioral 
or psychic rewards not factored into this analysis which is quite possible, even probable, or 
Entrepreneur returns are higher than heretofore contemplated. Part Two of this paper presents 
evidence of actual Entrepreneurial returns to explore the latter. Further research on behavioral 
asset pricing will be required to address the former.
II. Presentation of Actual Entrepreneurial Returns
The data was obtained from two databases on CD-ROM’s in Microsoft Excel format. 
The first is the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) Compustat database, which keeps extensive records 
on publicly traded stocks in all organized markets dating back to 1963. This data is gathered 
by S&P for purposes needed by consulting firms, market research firms, governmental use, 
and academic study. The Compustat database includes data on approximately 10,000 to 
15,000 firms depending on the years studied. The data obtained from S&P consists of a 
random sample of 1,000 publicly traded firms’ financial data covering the time period of 1982 
to 2000. The data consists of year-end stock price, sales, net income, earnings before interest 
and taxes (EBIT), P/E ratio, P/G ratio, P/EBIT ratio, SIC code, and year of data. Thus, this 
sample resulted in 1,000 firms times 19 years of data for a total of 19,000 data points.
The second database comes fi*om a private, nationally known organization that 
compiles data on small closely held business sale transactions. This database has been 
compiled by the Institute of Business Appraisers (IBA) in Plantation, Florida and consists of 
approximately 18,000 records of small business sales transactions since 1978. The data in the 
IBA database consists of SIC code, annual sales, annual net earnings as defined by IBA, 
owner’s compensation, P/E ratio, P/G ratio, sales price, geographic location, and year of sale. 
The data fi*om the IBA will be used as a surrogate for investment in a small. Entrepreneurial 
venture.
The Compustat data set represents a large sample of the population of all publicly 
traded stocks in the US. The IBA database is a large sample of the population of small 
business sale transactions since 1978 across about 600 SIC codes.
Assumptions and Limitations
The random sample of 1,000 publicly traded firms’ prices and other data may not be 
totally reflective of the entire market. It is also possible that using year-end data may not 
result in the average price of the stocks during the course of the year. Some analysts argue 
that year-end selling for tax prices can “artificially” deflate year-end stock prices only to see 
them rebound in January. This is known as the “January effect (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 
1998). The “January effect” is an observation and not an empirically proven fact. Therefore, 
the use of the year-end prices can be argued to be representative of the market s determination
of the stock’s price at that moment.
Another limitation is the use of data from 1982 through 2000 as opposed to using all 
data available from 1963 and from 2001 to 2006. This limitation exists as the 19 year time 
period may have captured an unusual time period for the publicly traded markets and may not 
include several business cycles or external events that occurred prior to 1982. Conversely, this 
long of a time frame should provide a representative “sample” of time and does capture 
different economic periods which provide a view of market data in good times and bad. In 
addition, the IBA database transaction data starts in about 1978. This pairing of data should
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provide similar market perceptions of publicly traded shares and small business sale 
transactions.
There are limitations on the use of the IBA database also. While the IBA database 
contains about 18,000 data points, it does not include all small business transactions. Thus, 
while it is the largest database of its kind, it may not totally reflect the entire population of 
small business sales.
A more important limitation is the accuracy of the IBA database. The IBA depends on 
reports from business brokers, realtors, accountants, and small business owners. There is a 
possibility that the data reported to the IBA is not totally accurate for a number of reasons 
including privacy issues, transcription error, or incorrect accounting methods. For example, 
the net earnings reported by companies may not be in accordance with US GAAP possibly 
invalidating the P/E computation. In addition, in order to “smooth” the net earnings figure and 
avoid issues of excess owner’s compensation, the IBA requests that net earnings be reported 
as net earnings before tax, interest, and owner’s compensation. The IBA admits that it is 
occasionally difficult to obtain this precise definition of net earnings from the data reporters. 
In order to account for the IBA definition of earnings, the P/EBIT ratio of the Compustat data 
was used as the measure of price to earnings to more accurately draw conclusions between the 
price to earnings figures of small versus large companies.
The research is based on the assumption that both databases are accurately assembled 
and represent the two populations from which they are derived. The extent to which the 
findings can be generalized to the populations of market data are based on these assumptions 
and limitations.
Procedures
The data from both sources were uploaded into SPSS, a statistical analysis software 
program for examination. Cases missing data were eliminated from fiirther study. Variables of 
interest were calculated as the EBIT/Price and EBIT/Sales and are hereinafter called Large 
E_P, Large E_S, Small E_P, and Small E_S where E_P equals EBIT/Price and E_S equals 
EBIT/Sales. “Large” indicates the publicly traded firms from the S&P 500 database, and 
“Small” denotes the private, closely held firms from the IBA database. Table IV shows 
summary statistics for all data:
Outliers were examined by observing both sets of data for observations that fell within 
the inter-quartile range. Data points outside the inter-quartile range were considered outliers 
and were eliminated (cleaned) from ftirther consideration. After data cleaning, the cases 
remaining numbered:
Cases
Description Sample Included Population % Included
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Large E_P N 16,386 19,000 86.2%
Large E_S N 16,317 19,000 85.9%
Small E_P N 10,201 11,562 88.2%
Small E_S N 10,567 11,562 91.4%
Data Processing and Analysis
Tables V through VIII represent the initial exploration of the cleaned data sorted by 
Large E_P and E_S contrasted to Small E_P and E_S.
The observations indicate that Large E_P averaged 12.5% over the 18 year period 
while Small E_P averaged 49.9%. This implies that the approximate pricing multiples for the
Large companies examined sold at an average Price to EBIT of - ^ « 8  0and Small
.125
companies sold at an average Price to EBIT of « 2.00. It can further be construed that
.499
investors were thus discounting future core operating earnings at an average of about 12.5% 
for Large firms and about 49.9% for Small firms. These figures appear to imply that the 
required rates of return, at least on a relative basis, reflect investors’ recognition of higher risk 
with Small firms along with a required return for lack of diversification as alluded to earlier in 
the study by Kerins, Smith, and Smith. The return on Sales measured by EBIT to Sales 
averaged 9.48% for Large firms and 22.6% for Small firms. Thus, pricing multiple averaged
-----« 4.00 while earnings on Sales multiples averaged « 2.39 indicating a
fairly wide disparity between perceived returns on Sales and actual sale prices “traded”. If the 
Large and Small classes were viewed by the investors as being of equivalent risk (measured 
using both systematic and unsystematic risk), it could be expected that the higher returns on 
Sales of the Small firms, 22.6% contrasted to the 9.48% average for Large firms would 
adequately compensate investors for excess risk involved in investing in a Small venture. In 
this sample, investors paid an average of $ 8.00 for each $ 1.00 of Large firm operating 
earnings and $ 2.00 for each $1.00 of Small firm operating earnings. Based only on relative 
performance on Sales, investors should have paid a multiple of (2.00 * 2.39)« 4.78 for Large 
firms in lieu of the 8.0 actually observed or the multiple of Small E_S should have been 
f 10 54^
——  w 4.41 instead of the 2.39 actually observed. Clearly, the investors in both markets 
. 2.39 j
perceived some other factors in the pricing decision.
A linear regression analysis, shown in Table IX, using average Large E_P as the 
independent variable and Small E_P as the dependent variable was significant and, holding 
the intercept at zero, indicated a Beta of 3.926 with a correlation of .9788.
The actual correlation of the two data sets was found by drawing a random sample of 1,000 
data points from each cleaned set of observations. The descriptive statistics found using a 
large sample of all the data are shown in Table X:
The summary statistics of the large sample of data indicate that the averages used in 
Tables V through VIII are representative of the data. The actual correlation between both 
variable sets is approximately zero. If the average Large E_P and Small E_P regression is 
used as a surrogate for a proposed Beta for Large predicting Small or , an inference can
be drawn that the required return for an Entrepreneurial Venture could be estimated using the 
CAPM model. Thus, R^y = r^+ Ps\l - ' '/ ) +  Intercept which given the data above would
equate to an overall expected required retum of 
4% + 3.926(12.5% -  4% )+12.5%,„,,,,^ ,^ « 49% for a generalized estimate of a required retum
in a small. Entrepreneurial venture. The Intercept is added back to the regression due to the
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forcing of the intercept at the origin. In effect, the estimated market return equates to being 
the intercept and only the variability about the origin is being measured by the correlation in 
the regression. This point estimate of about 49% is very close to the actual Capital Access 
Points presented by Slee in Table III required by Angel Investors and Factoring Firms of 40% 
to 50% which, at least intuitively, seems rational. In addition, assuming a low correlation with 
the market, Kerins, Smith, and Smith’s model in Table I estimates a range of 38.7% to 50.2% 
required return for investment in an Entrepreneurial venture with weights invested in the 
venture of 30% and 50% respectively. This return included the premium for under- 
diversification. Schilt’s method, in Table II, indicated that empirical observations of venture 
required returns ranged from a low of about 10% to a high of 34%. These rates however, did 
not include consideration of under-diversification and seem to match up well with the returns 
actually observed by Small E_S of 22.67% reported in Table VIII.
A final consideration would be the proposed weights to be placed in each of the three 
considered investment sets, the risk free rate, the market, or the Entrepreneurial venture. This 
would be a function of the expected returns, standard deviations, and covariance of the 
returns. Table XI assumes the means and standard deviations as presented for Large E_P and 
Small E_P with the observed correlation of .004. The minimum variance and optimal 
portfolio are presented of the two risky assets along with computations of a Capital Allocation 
Line for an investor assumed to be a mean-variance optimizer desiring a 20% rate of return 
overall.
The minimum variance portfolio calls for only a 6.36% weight into the venture while 
an optimal portfolio using the data presented would require placing 27.17% into the 
Entrepreneurial Venture and 72.83% into the market. Assuming a portfolio 20% required 
return for an individual investor, 14.38% would be invested at the risk fi*ee rate, 23.26% 
would be placed into the Entrepreneurial venture and 62.36% would be invested in the 
market. Clearly, given the data, limitations, and assumptions presented, greater than about a 
30% weight placed in an Entrepreneurial venture would be suboptimal.
III. Summary, Conclusions, and Implications
The intent of this analysis was to derive a generalized required return for an 
Entrepreneurial venture utilizing the existing literature, empirical observations, and analysis 
of actual transactions of market and small business data. The mean size of the IBA small 
business determined by market price is $ 2,530,000. Thus, the analysis examines micro 
companies contrasted to large, S&P 500 firms which comprise the surrogate for the market 
return. It follows that the return profiles should range from the risk fi*ee rate through the retum 
on a large, well organized market, up to a theoretical maximum required by small 
Entrepreneurs. These returns were found to approximate:
Rf « 4% Rj^  ^ « 12.5% R^y « 49%
These findings are restricted by the assumptions and limitations in the study coupled 
with the use of EBIT as the metric for returns generated by the Entrepreneur. Further, these 
returns would vary from venture to venture given the risk profiles of each venture’s cash 
flows. The weight of the Entrepreneur’s wealth placed in the venture would also cause the 
required retum to vary. In short, the findings are broad and not intended as a “cookbook” 
recipe for all Entrepreneurial ventures.
However, it is assumed that the typical Entrepreneur probably does not consider the 
five assumptions listed at the end of Part One and almost certainly do not consider the effects
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of under-diversification caused by a heavily weighted commitment to an Entrepreneurial 
venture. The data presented in this study imply that buyers (and sellers) of Entrepreneurial 
ventures discount future earnings as measured by EBIT by about 49% or at a Price/EBIT 
(P/EBIT) multiple of about 2. The market’s future earnings are discounted at about 12.5% or a 
P/EBIT multiple of 8. The generator of earnings, return on Sales is about 9.5% for Large 
firms and 22.7% for Small. Clearly, the earnings of Large, better diversified portfolios are 
more highly valued by buyers than earnings of Small, undiversified ventures. However, those 
same earnings on Sales are the generator of the returns to the Entrepreneur and with a high 
degree of probability more accurately reflect returns earned by Entrepreneurs than the Sales 
prices of the small businesses. The inference is that an Entrepreneur considering investment in 
a venture would tend to expect returns in a range of 20% to 30% as observed by Schilt in 
Table IL The model presented by Kerins, Smith, and Smith as well as the findings of this 
study imply that Entrepreneurial returns would need to be in the 40% to 50% range to provide 
return mean-variance optimization. Based on the findings of this study and those of Kerins, 
Smith, and Smith, and assuming a generalized required return range for an undiversified, 
small Entrepreneur of about 45% to 49%, it is possible to solve for an Entrepreneurial “Beta” 
range of about 42% ^  49% « 4% + J3^ y (10% -  4%) « p^y « 6.3 ^ 7 . 5
The conclusion must be that, viewed solely from a pecuniary perspective. 
Entrepreneurs do not earn sufficient returns given the risk they take. The position taken by 
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen, quoted at the end of Part One of this paper appears to be 
accurate. Additionally, there are undoubtedly “psychic returns” unmeasured in this study, that 
accrue to the Entrepreneur which are consciously or subconsciously factored into the decision 
to enter into an Entrepreneurial venture. This area of Behavioral Finance needs to be 
researched further to contemplate factors that compensate Entrepreneurs. Slee (2004) puts it 
well stating “A private business is relative to the value world in which it is viewed”.
For example, consider an Entrepreneur with $ 100,000 to invest in a venture where 
he/she expects to earn returns of 20%, a standard deviation of 40% and 0% correlation with 
the market. Will he/she truly contemplate that an optimal portfolio decision, given market 
returns of 10% and standard deviation of 20%, would consist of placing 40% of the funds into 
the Entrepreneurial venture and 60% in a market portfolio which would generate an expected 
return of 14% with a standard deviation of 20%? In reaUty, this type of asset partitioning may 
not be possible but is it considered? Many, perhaps most. Entrepreneurs would invest the full 
$ 100,000 into the venture “counting” on making the 20% or greater. Additionally, a great 
deal of human capital, unaccounted for, would be invested thereby lowering total returns. 
Conversely, how is psychic income measured implying a greater overall Total return than 
that which can be measured using any methodology examined heretofore? It is notable that 
buyers of small Entrepreneurial ventures evidently discounted future cash flows at a mean of 
49% to purchase firms that were earning an average of 22% on Sales.
This study raises as many or more questions than it answers. The data indicate that 
Entrepreneurs, viewed from a purely financial perspective, earn less than required given the 
risks involved in their ventures. Many are under-diversified. Are they uninformed or 
irrational? Is psychic income rationally worth more than financial return? What are the 
behavioral issues? How can they be measured? Shefrin (2007) discusses concepts and 
measures of Representativeness and Over-optimism. These and many other issues need to be 
addressed prior to drawing further conclusions.
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Table I
Required Returns: Weight in Venture given correlation with market
________________ \\yg|ht in Vaiture-Corrdation with Market Orosstable_________________
______________________Correlation - Venture, Nfettet_____________________
Venture 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80P/o 90% 100% 
0% 4.0% 7.8% 11.5% 15.3% 19.0% 228% 26.5% 30.3% 34.0% 37.8% 41.5% 
10% 17.2% 20.5% 23.5% 26.4% 29.0% 31.5% 33.8% 35.9% 37.9% 39.8% 41.5% 
20% 29.0/0 31.4% 33.1% 34.^/o 36.0% 37.2% 38.2% 39.2% 40.1% 40.8% 41.5% 
30% 3&7% 39.3% 39.8% 40.2% 40.6% 40.9% 41.1% 41.2% 41.4% 41.4% 41.5%
44.5"/(| 44.2% 43.8% 43.4% 43.0% 426% 422% 41.9% 41.5%40P/o 45.3% 44.9%
50% 50.2% 49.0% 48.0% 47.0% 46.1% 45.2% 44.4% 43.6% 429% 422% 41.5%
60% 53.9% 52Z>/o 50.e>/o 49.1% 47.8% 46m  45.4% 44.3% 43.3% 424% 41.5>/o
70% 56l8% 54.0>/o 520>/o 50.8% 49.2% 47.6% 462% 44.9% 43.7% 420% 41.5>/o
80% 59.1% 56.0>/o 54.3% 522% 502% 4&5% 46.9% 45.4% 44.0% 427% 41.5%
90% 61.0% 5&2% 55.6% 53.3% 51.1% 49.2% 47.4% 45.7% 442% 428% 41.5%
100% 626% 59.5% 56.7% 54.2% 51.9% 49.7% 47.8% 4&0% 44.4% 429% 41.5%
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Table II 
Schilt’s Risk Premia




Established businesses with a strong trade 6 -1 0 %  4% 10-14%
position, are well financed, have depth in 
management, whose past earnings have been 
stable and whose future is highly predictable.
Estabhshed businesses in a more competitive 11 -  15% 4% 15 -  19%
industry that are well financed, have depth of 
management, have stable past earnings and 
whose future is fairly predictable.
Businesses in a highly competitive industry 16-20% 4% 20-24%
that require little capital to enter, no 
management depth, element of risk is high, 
although past record may be good.
Small businesses that depend on the special 21-25% 4% 25-29%
skill of one or two people. Larger established 
businesses that are highly cyclical in nature.
Future eamings may be expected to deviate 
widely fi*om projections.
Small “one man” businesses of a personal 26-30% 4% 30-34%
services nature, where the transferability of 
the income stream is in question.
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Table III
Private Capital Returns as Presented by Slee (2004)
Capital Access 
Point
Description Expected Expected Expected 
Return with Return with Return with 























Industrial Revenue Bonds 
SBA 504 Loan 
Business & Industry Loan 
Tier 1 Asset Based Loan 
SBA 7(a) Loan 
Bank Equipment Leasing 
CaptiveA e^ndor Equipment Leasing 
SBA CAPline Credit Line 
Bank Credit line 
Tier 2 Asset Based Loan 
SBA Export Working Coital Program 
Specialty Equipment Leasing 
Tier 3 Asset Based Loan 
Venture Capital Leasing 
Debt Mezzanine Capital 
Equity Mezzanine Capital 








































































* Prime rate at various notional amounts. Slee reports 7% only, the 8% and 9% Prime rates are inferred.
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Table IV 
Summary Statistics of all Data
Descriptive Statistics - All Data
























Year N Mean Std. D ev Minimum M axim u m Range Kurtosis Skewness
1982 731 0.136 0.086 -0.059 0 .307 0 .366 -0.694 -0.008
1983 794 0.127 0.081 -0 .060 0 .310 0 .370 -0.392 0.062
1984 771 0.148 0.081 -0 .059 0 .310 0 .369 -0.363 -0.127
1985 863 0.131 0.080 -0 .059 0 .310 0 .369 -0.352 0.050
1986 863 0.125 0.073 -0 .059 0 .306 0.365 -0.177 0.061
1987 860 0.136 0.079 -0 .060 0 .309 0 .369 -0.533 -0.088
1988 855 0.138 0.078 -0 .059 0 .309 0.368 -0.275 -0.090
1989 871 0.133 0.073 -0 .056 0 .309 0.365 -0.279 -0.008
1990 805 0.140 0.078 -0 .058 0 .309 0 .367 -0.306 -0.073
1991 860 0.117 0.071 -0 .058 0 .309 0.367 0.099 0.256
1992 876 0.112 0.068 -0 .060 0 .309 0.368 0.336 0.405
1993 913 0.110 0.066 -0 .059 0 .308 0 .367 0.415 0.342
1994 910 0.125 0.068 -0 .058 0 .304 0.362 0.131 0.116
1995 931 0.117 0.069 -0 .059 0.305 0.364 0.200 0.178
1996 940 0.114 0.064 -0 .058 0 .307 0.365 0.331 0.189
1997 946 0.101 0.056 -0.055 0 .309 0.365 1.205 0.271
1998 902 0.114 0.066 -0 .059 0 .310 0.369 0.325 0.209
1999 868 0.127 0.075 -0 .058 0 .310 0.368 -0.404 0.074
2000 827 0.126 0.074 -0 .054 0 .308 0.362 -0 .360 0.170
Totals / Avgs 16,386 0.1251 0 .0730 -0 .058 0 .308 0.367 -0.058 0.105
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Table VI 
Small E P



















































































































































































Year N Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum Range Kurtosis Skewness
1982 868 0.093 0.072 -0.089 0.270 0.359 -0.252 0.244
1983 861 0.097 0.073 -0.090 0.270 0.360 -0.322 0.169
1984 861 0.099 0.071 -0.088 0.269 0.356 -0.184 0.189
1985 862 0.093 0.073 -0.087 0.269 0.357 -0.313 0.282
1986 837 0.092 0.073 -0.087 0.267 0.354 -0.150 0.360
1987 849 0.093 0.071 -0.087 0.269 0.356 -0.127 0.440
1988 868 0.097 0.072 -0.088 0.269 0.358 -0.190 0.331
1989 871 0.098 0.070 -0.087 0.270 0.357 -0.190 0.399
1990 880 0.093 0.073 -0.087 0.268 0.355 -0.261 0.387
1991 878 0.087 0.072 -0.088 0.269 0.358 0.003 0.507
1992 863 0.088 0.070 -0.088 0.269 0.356 0.056 0.516
1993 855 0.091 0.068 -0.090 0.265 0.355 0.088 0.459
1994 861 0.095 0.067 -0.077 0.269 0.346 0.047 0.505
1995 866 0.098 0.069 -0.083 0.269 0.352 -0.250 0.368
1996 862 0.100 0.068 -0.082 0.269 0.352 -0.127 0.412
1997 853 0.103 0.068 -0.079 0.270 0.349 -0.094 0.350
1998 835 0.098 0.068 -0.087 0.270 0.357 0.058 0.331
1999 847 0.095 0.068 -0.086 0.270 0.356 -0.158 0.222
2000 840 0.093 0.071 -0.090 0.265 0.355 -0.264 0.275
Totals /  A vgs 16,317 0.0948 0.0705 -0.086 0.269 0.355 -0.139 0.355
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Table VIII 















































































































































































T o t a l s / A v g s  10,567 0.2267 0.1439 -0.065 0.596 0.662 -0.386 0.527
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Table IX
Linear Regression Output and Correlation of Average EBIT to Price
SLMVIARYOUIPUr







df M* F S^ficxmceF
R^iession 1 4.6222 4.6?,Z>, 411.45^ 2.37571Erl3
Residual 18 0.2022 0.0112
Total 19 4.8245
Co^dents Stcmdcff-dEmr tStat P-vdue Lower 95% 0 ^ 9 5 %  LcMer95.0P/o Upper95.(P/o
Intercept 0 m A m/A m /K miK m/K ^ A
























Coefficients have been calculated through the origia
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Table X
Descriptive Statistics of 1,000 cases of both E_P and E_S; Cleaned Data
Descriptive Statistics - Sanple o f 1, OOP Cases
Small E P Lar^eE P Small E S LargeE S
Ivfean 0.5324 Mean 0.1250 Mean 0.2553 Nfean 0.1107
Standard Deviati(m 0.2765 Standard Deviaticm 0.0750 Standard Deviation 0.1705 Standard Deviation 0.3009
Mnirniim -0.1570 Minimum -0.0590 IVBnimum -0.0630 Mnimum -70470
/^feximum 1.2590 ]Vfeximum 0.3100 IVfeximum 1.0000 IVfaxinium 0.9810
N 1,000 N 1,000 N 1,000 N 1,000
Correlations - Sanple of1,000 Cases
Small E P Large E P Small E ^  Large E ^
Small E_P 1 SmaUE_P 1
Large E_P 0.004 1 TargeE P -0.001 1
N 1,000 N 1,000
Table XI
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Optimal Portfolio CAL Allocations 
0.00% 14.38%
27.17%  23.26%
72.83%  62.36%
22.69%  20.00%
9.26% 7.93%



